Sl.	Particulars	No. of	Gist of Public Comments	Analysis
No.		Comments		
		Received		
1.	Discussion	34	(1) Under Regulation 7(2) of IP Regulations, after (bb) new sub	The IBBI (Model Bye-Laws and Governing Board of
	Paper - IPA	(including	regulation (bc) has been proposed to be inserted where in there is	Insolvency Professional Agencies) Regulations, 2016 were
	IU	5 test, 10	mention of Certificate of Practice; but there is no mention of age	amended w.e.f. 23rd July 2019 to incorporate age limit of
	Regulations	repeat, 5	below 70 which is must to get Certificate of Practice may be	seventy years for obtaining Authorisation For Assignment.
		irrelevant)	because COP to be issued by IPA however in case of amendment	
			of IPA Regulation also I have not found any reference of	
			Certificate of Practice and to get COP age below 70 is must;	
			Suggestion: I think one paragraph of COP & to get COP age below	
			70 is must; can be inserted in IP Regulation and also in the IPA	
			Regulation.	
			(2) In the IPA regulations, it is proposed to raise the maximum age	The time is the essence of the Code and an IP is required to
			limit of the independent directors from the age of 70 years to 75	perform his duties under the Code within the time
			years, whereas in the proposed amendments to IP regulations, age	prescribed under the Code. Any recusal /pre-mature exist
			restriction of 70 years is being put in place for assignment of work	of an IP from the process, not only affect the timelines
			as RP/IRP/ AR/ Liquidator etc. Thus, the thought process for	under the Code but also jeopardises the interest of all
			amendments to IPA & IP regulations are contradictory to each	stakeholders of an already ailing CD. The Board has
			other. There should be uniformity in respect of age restrictions in	observed certain instances wherein the IPs, after taking up
			different regulations.	assignments, requested for discharge from the assignment
				on account of various factors, poor health due to age, being
				one of them.
				Further, it is also to be noted that normally other
				professional assignments do not require, practising
				professional to undertake active management
				responsibilities of a business, whereas, an IP has onerous
				responsibilities under the Code which are demanding, both

## Public Comments on the issues related to Service Providers (IPA and IU) - Analysis of responses received

	physically and mentally. Also, during the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP), an IP replaces the Board of Directors and manages the affairs / operations of the Corporate Debtor (CD) as a going concern. The job of an IP is thus not less demanding than that of a Managing Director appointed under the provisions of Companies Act, 2013. It is prominent to note that in terms of section 196 of the Companies Act, 2013, an individual above the age of 70 years is not ordinarily eligible to be a Managing Director, Whole time director or Manager, given the demanding responsibilities of such positions. This warrants that the age limit as applicable to a Managing Director under the Companies Act, 2013 should also be made applicable in case of IPs registered under the provisions of the Code. Accordingly, imposition of age limit of 70 years maximum, for IPs for undertaking assignments under the Code would rectify the legal anomaly, considering that the
	Code is to be read in congruence with the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.
<ul> <li>(3) In the IPA regulations the age limit of independent directors</li> <li>(IP) is proposed to be increased to 75 years of age from the existing</li> <li>70 years, whereas in IP regulations it is being proposed to restrict</li> <li>the assignments as IRP /RP/ AR/ liquidator to an IP up to the age</li> <li>of 70. Both the proposals are contradictory to each other. Further</li> <li>in no other profession CA/ cost accounts/ company secretary/</li> <li>advocates/ medicine etc any age limit is prescribed.</li> </ul>	The comments are similar to (2) above, hence the reply is same as (2) above.
<ul><li>(4) Age limit is unacceptable as a successful CIRP process is dependent to a large extent on the age and experience of the IP and restricting experienced professionals from practice will be</li></ul>	The comments are similar to (2) above, hence the reply is same as (2) above.

<ul> <li>detrimental to the very purpose of IBC which is resolution of stressed assets.</li> <li>(5) The activity of Verification &amp; Authentication applies generally to all Financial Information and not just to default. Facilitating</li> </ul>	Under the provisions of the Code, default is the trigger for
(5) The activity of Verification & Authentication applies generally	
such verification and authentication for all financial information is a core service of IU as defined u/s 3 (9) of IBC. Hence the process	initiating CIRP. Therefore, authentication of all the available information irrespective of the fact whether it pertains to defaulting CD or not does not meet the requirement of the Code.
of Verification & Authentication of information needs to be equally defined in the Regulations. In view of this, the proposed amendment to define the process and context of deemed authentication may be considered to be brought under definition	
clause of Reg 2 of IU Regulations instead of restricting it only in the context of Reg 21. It will have the desired effect of enhancing the objective of IBC for storage of prima facie legal evidence in the IU.	
(6) Receipt of notice of dispute from the debtor, need to be predefined for debtor to understand what acceptable form of dispute and acceptable document/information debtor is is supposed to submit against each criterion in built in system. This may not provide 100% clarity, however, surely bring objectivity and way for faster determination of the status of default.	As per the technical standards, the three types of status of authentication shall be communicated in three different colours. The communication shall clarify the status of authentication. On receipt of notice of dispute, the status of authenticated maybe provided as "Disputed". Therefore, IBBI (Information Utilities) Regulations, 2017 were amended w.e.f. 25 <sup>th</sup> July 2019 and the Technical standards have been reviewed and amended w.e.f. 22 <sup>nd</sup> January 2020.
<ul> <li>(7) The Amendments proposed, especially Deemed Authentication provides needed strength for the process of authentication. Eliminate scope for- Debtors to ignore the Authentication Invitation E-mails / letters of IU, frivolous legal litigations and consequent delays in Resolution Process. Benefits Financial Creditors to obtain the force of law in its favour when Debtors strategically remain silent to e-mails/letters of IU. Under the concept of Verification, the Debtor may agree or dispute the</li> </ul>	As per the technical standards, the three types of status of authentication shall be communicated in three different colours. The communication shall clarify the status of authentication. On receipt of notice of dispute, the status of authenticated maybe provided as "Disputed". Therefore, IBBI (Information Utilities) Regulations, 2017 were amended w.e.f. 25 <sup>th</sup> July 2019.
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affixes the Authentication with his Digital Signature. Therefore,	
receipt of notice of dispute need not be treated as Information not	
Authenticated merely on the ground of raising dispute.	
(8) An IUs if does become a Listed Company shall have to	Suggestion accepted. The IBBI (Information Utilities)
compulsorily comply with the LODR, hence, the SEBI intent of	Regulations, 2017 were amended w.e.f. 25 <sup>th</sup> July 2019.
making Listed Companies highly compliant will be satisfied.	
Further, the Companies Act 2013 also does not have an upper limit	
on the age for Independent Directors for any type of the Company.	
The Companies Act 2013, has restriction in the form of Age only	
for the Managing Director, Whole-Time Director or Manager in	
section 196(3). It is submitted that regulation 24 (3) of the	
Securities Contract (Regulation) (Stock Exchanges and Clearing	
Corporations) Regulations, 2018 which earlier provided the upper	
age limit of 70 years of independent directors of stock exchange	
and clearing corporations, has since been amended on 3 October,	
2018 to provide age limit of 75 years. We submit to the Board	
being a regulator to consider and align the age limit of independent	
directors of information utilities in line with the other regulators.	
In the light above, we propose to submit our representation as	
Information Utility to IBBI to amend the Regulations to increase	
 the upper age 75 years for independent directors of IUs.	
(9) As per the currently applicable Guidelines for Technical	Suggestion accepted. IBBI (Information Utilities)
Standards (Guidelines), response to an authentication request	Regulations, 2017 were amended w.e.f. 25 <sup>th</sup> July 2019 and the Technical standards have been reviewed and amended
would be segregated into one of five heads. In order to ensure	w.e.f. 22 <sup>nd</sup> January 2020.
consistency between the Guidelines and the IU Regulations, the	(ion: 22) Valuary 20201
Guidelines need to be accordingly amended to provide for only	
three possible categorizations of authentication status, as proposed	
to be captured in the Regulation 21(4). Further, the Guidelines	
currently allow for information to be disputed, in part or whole.	
The proposed amendment to the IU Regulations however does not	
allow for the same. Accordingly, clarity must be provided in this	

regard and consistency should be maintained between the	
Guidelines and IU Regulations.	
<ul> <li>(10) In the current regime, financial creditors are required to undertake reporting requirements such as to Credit Information Companies under the Credit Information Companies (Amendment) Regulations, 2017, CERSAI under Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, Central Repository of Information on Large Credits pursuant to RBI notification dated May 22, 2014 (and other amendments). Furthermore, security data is required to be submitted to</li> <li>(a) Registrar of Companies</li> <li>(b) Regional transport office for security interest over motor vehicle</li> </ul>	Regulation 26 (1) provides for porting of information from other registries. The standards for authentication are different for various repositories. Therefore, suggestion not accepted.
(c) DGCA for security interest over aircraft	
(d) Registrar of ships for security interest over ship/vessel and	
(e) sub-registrar of assurances for registered mortgages as well as	
for equitable mortgages (where notice of intimation is required to be filed).	
Reporting/submission of data to each of these agencies entail cost implications on the submitter, many of which data submitted are	
repetitive and common with various agencies. Therefore, we	
recommend IU to seamlessly connect with these agencies and	
auto-populate and consolidate the data already available with these	
agencies, in its records. Only incremental data (not available with	
any of the aforesaid agencies) should be sought from the financial	
creditor. Consolidation of data by IU through inter-portability with	
various agencies will result in cost saving, curtailing repetitive	
submissions. Furthermore, data submitted to the ROC (vide CHG-	
1 filing) is verified by the debtor/security provider and a digital	
signature is affixed by the security provider representative which	

<ul> <li>debior might not want to authenticate the fact that a default has been committed as a result of which the entire purpose of setting up of IUs and authentication of information submitted to them would stand defeated. These concerns have also been echoed by the Report of the Working Group on Information Utilities set up by the MCA. In the case of default, the debtor might not want to authenticate the fact that a default has been committed. To work around such situations, the committee proposes to redefine "concerned parties" in this case to include a bank which maintains the account in which the repayment amount has to be deposited by the debtor. This bank will be able to authenticate whether there has been default or not, by providing the account statement of the repayment account. This prevents the debtor from holding the process hostage, while preserving the evidentiary value of records in the IU. Accordingly, we propose that the Code and the IU Regulations be suitably modified so as to impose a mandatory obligation on the concerned parties to authenticate the information submitted to the IUS. Further, we recommend that pecuniary liability must be imposed for non-compliance with the aforementioned obligation, in addition to the occurrence of deemed authentication, as captured in the proposed regulations.</li> <li>(12) The concept of deemed authentication has been proposed to be instituted only for "information of default". In our view, the concept of deemed authentication should extend to all financial</li> </ul>		
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Regulations be suitably modified so as to impose a mandatory obligation on the concerned parties to authenticate the information submitted to the IUs. Further, we recommend that pecuniary liability must be imposed for non-compliance with the aforementioned obligation, in addition to the occurrence of deemed authentication, as captured in the proposed regulations.         (12) The concept of deemed authentication has been proposed to be instituted only for "information of default". In our view, the concept of deemed authentication should extend to all financial       The rationale in respect of default is that a debtor is unlikely to authenticate a default. This argument may not be	in the IU. Accordingly, we propose that the Code and the IU	
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submitted to the IUs. Further, we recommend that pecuniary       submitted to the IUs. Further, we recommend that pecuniary         liability must be imposed for non-compliance with the       aforementioned obligation, in addition to the occurrence of         deemed authentication, as captured in the proposed regulations.       (12) The concept of deemed authentication has been proposed to         be instituted only for "information of default". In our view, the       The rationale in respect of default is that a debtor is unlikely         to authenticate a default. This argument may not be       extendable to all information.		
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aforementioned obligation, in addition to the occurrence of deemed authentication, as captured in the proposed regulations.       The rationale in respect of default is that a debtor is unlikely to authenticate a default. This argument may not be concept of deemed authentication should extend to all financial		
deemed authentication, as captured in the proposed regulations.         (12) The concept of deemed authentication has been proposed to be instituted only for "information of default". In our view, the concept of deemed authentication should extend to all financial       The rationale in respect of default is that a debtor is unlikely to authenticate a default. This argument may not be extendable to all information.		
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be instituted only for "information of default". In our view, the concept of deemed authentication should extend to all financial to authenticate a default. This argument may not be	(12) The concept of deemed authentication has been proposed to	The rationale in respect of default is that a debtor is unlikely
concept of deemed authentication should extend to all financial extendable to all information.		
	concept of deemed authentication should extend to all financial	
	information submitted to the IUs and the process for such deemed	

authentication would be analogous to the procedure specified in	
the proposed Regulation 21.	
(13) The stages are not correctly defined. If the Debtor disputes, it should be advised as Documents disputed by Debtor. If the Debtor does not authenticate in any given time frame, the Documents will remain unauthenticated. Authentication cannot be presumed or assumed. It is bad in approach. IU and other processes are not ruled by Creditors. Nobody is a ruler. Giving credit and availing credit is a private business between two parties. The administrative system cannot be biased towards one. Giving credit is a private decision of the creditor and it is not a public privilege provided to anybody who borrows. If it is not authenticated up to any number of days, IT has to be reported by the Utility as REMAINS UNAUTHENTICATED; the obligation of the Utility may be	The three types of status of authentication shall be communicated in three different colours. The communication shall clarify the status of authentication. On receipt of notice of dispute, the status of authenticated maybe provided as "Disputed". There has to be a finality to any process including that of "authentication" and status of "remain authenticated" cannot be accepted. The suggestion is not accepted. Therefore, IBBI (Information Utilities) Regulations, 2017 were amended w.e.f. 25 <sup>th</sup> July 2019.
terminated at the end of any fixed period proposed.	
<ul> <li>(14) As per the Supreme Court judgement on Aadhaar, the use of Aadhaar as identifier is only subject to matters related to obtaining government subsidy, benefits and cannot be mandated by any other entity. It also specifies that private entities cannot mandate Aadhaar.</li> <li>2. The IBBI Technical standards extensively use Aadhaar in multiple places violating not just Supreme Court guidelines but also UIDAI regulations pertaining to storage and use of Aadhaar numbers. These includes Technical Standards 13(2)(c) and 13(2)(f) pertaining to registration and verification of identity of individual user. Use of Aadhaar is not backed by law and hence IBBI technical standards needs to be updated to use alternate identifiers for individual users registering with IU for availing any IU services. b. The clause pertaining to verification of identity with UIDAI is expressly prohibited by law as use of Aadhaar and eKYC is prohibited as per Aadhaar judgement. c. 13(2)(d) - Unique</li> </ul>	Technical standards have been reviewed and amended w.e.f. 22 <sup>nd</sup> January 2020 to take into account these observations.

Identifier for each record and each Use again proposes Aadhaar to
be used as unique identifier. Please note that as per the judgement
and regulations by UIDAI, storage of Aadhaar number is
prohibited by entities for purposes other than subsidy. Entities can
at best store only the last 4 digits of UID and can only store
tokenized hashes of UID and must not be storing UID of
individuals. d. 13(2)(d) also uses Aadhaar as part of Unique Debt
Identifier and stores 12 digits Aadhaar number in plain text. This
is directly in violation with regulations issued by UIDAI in regard
to data security and use of Aadhaar number in applications.
https://www.uidai.gov.in/images/resource/FAQs_Aadhaar_Data_
Vault_v1_0_13122017.pdfe. 13(2)(j) Consent Framework for
providing access to information to third parties also refers to
consent artefact containing Aadhaar number of representatives to
whom consent is provided. Use of Aadhaar here as well is not
backed by law.
3. For the above noted inconsistencies with Aadhaar Act,
Regulations of UIDAI with regards to storage and use of Aadhaar
number in applications and the Supreme Court judgement on the
Aadhaar case, it is suggested that the use of Aadhaar in the
technical standards to be reviewed and suitable alternatives like
use of PAN is used for individuals users for registration,
verification, unique debt ID as is being done with the case of non-
individual users using IU services.
4. It is also suggested that IBBI audit IU to ensure compliance with
laws, regulations related to Aadhaar and conduct a full IT audit to
ensure full compliance after the technical standards is modified to
be compliant with law.

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